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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

V.

:

ROGELIO LIMONTA LEYVA,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 940758-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This an appeal from a conviction for failure to respond
to an officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (1993).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1995).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court properly conclude that

defendant's waiver of Miranda rights was knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary?
A trial court's legal conclusion of a valid Miranda
waiver is reviewed for correctness.
941 (Utah 1994).

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,

"However, this standard of review grants a

measure of discretion to the trial court because of the
variability of the factual settings."

Id.

Indeed, "[i]n the

face of a factual dispute which necessarily bears upon
credibility, it [is] for the trial court to appropriately weigh
the evidence and assess credibility of the witnesses."
Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 299 (Utah 1992).

State v.

These underlying factual

determinations are reviewed for clear error.

Id.

Accord State

v. James, 858 P.2d 1012, 1016 (Utah App. 1993).
2.

Did the trial court properly limit defendant's

cross-examination of Trooper Wassmer?
Defendant's constitutional challenge is waived for
failure to adequately raise it below, State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d
1141, 1144-45 (Utah 1989), and for failure to articulate a plain
error or other exceptional circumstance excusing the waiver.
State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 705 n.2 (Utah App. 1993); State
v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1992).

Defendant's

evidentiary challenge is waived for failure to comply with the
briefing rule.

Utah R. App. Pro. 24(a)(9); State v. Price, 827

P.2d 247, 249 n.5 (Utah App. 1992).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions,
statutes and rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with failure to respond to an
officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (1993), and possession of a controlled
substance (cocaine), a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)(1994), which charge was subsequently
dismissed (R. 7-8, 21).
Defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained in
alleged violation of the state and federal constitutions (R. 232

24).

Following an evidentiary hearing on the matter, the trial

court denied defendant's motion (R. 63-66).
A jury trial was held October 11-12, 1995, at the
conclusion of which defendant was convicted as charged (R. 147).
The trial court sentenced defendant to zero to five
years in the Utah State Prison, to be served consecutive to any
other term defendant was then serving (R. 153).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
At approximately 9:00 p.m. on the evening of July 24,
1994, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Jon Wassmer was patrolling
south bound traffic on 1-15 near 4500 South in Salt Lake City,
Utah (R. 208). A yellow car travelling ahead of the trooper
caught his attention because it was "sagging badly to one side"
(R. 209). Surprised that the yellow car could have passed
inspection, Trooper Wassmer ran a license plate check based on
his suspicion that the driver had switched the plates on the car
(R. 209). Dispatch reported that the plates on the yellow car
were registered to a 1984 Buick (R. 210). Trooper Wassmer pulled
up alongside the yellow car and confirmed that it was not a
Buick, but a 1988 Oldsmobile (R. 210). Defendant, who was the
sole occupant of the car, glanced over at the trooper as he
travelled along side of defendant's car (R. 210-11).

1

Since the primary issue on this appeal is the
suppression issue, the pertinent facts are gleaned from the
transcript of the suppression hearing held September 26, 1994 (R.
205-243).
3

Based on the license plate violation, Trooper Wassmer
determined to stop defendant's car (R. 211). He turned on his
overhead emergency lights and pulled up within a few feet of
defendant's rear bumper (R. 211). Defendant immediately sped up,
increasing his speed from approximately 55 m.p.h. to 75 m.p.h.
(R. 212). Trooper Wassmer turned on his siren and began to
pursue defendant's fleeing car (R. 212). Trooper Wassmer
observed that defendant "was just jamming his way through
traffic," forcing other drivers to "take evasive type action" (R.
212).

Defendant "passed in the emergency lane when all the lanes

were occupied, much faster than the traffic flow" (R. 212).
At one point defendant started down the 7200 South offramp "and then he cut back across . . . the painted island, and
back on to the freeway" (R. 212). In pursuing the fleeing
vehicle, Trooper Wassmer observed defendant "speeding, cutting
people off, passing in the emergency lane, . . . [and] following
too close" (R. 212).
Defendant left the interstate again at the 9000 South
off-ramp, again "pass[ing] to the right of a vehicle[] in the
emergency lane" (R. 213). The chase came to end when defendant
crashed at the bottom of the off-ramp:

"[H]e was going way too

fast to take the turn at the bottom . . . , and he crashed into
the island" (R. 213). As the trooper approached to arrest him,
defendant put his hands in the air (R. 214).
Trooper Wassmer immediately handcuffed and searched
defendant before placing him in the patrol car (R. 214-15).

4

Trooper Wassmer did not read defendant his Miranda2 rights at
that time, waiting instead until he "intended to do formal
questioning" (R. 215). However, in the course of handcuffing
defendant, Trooper Wassmer did ask, "So why were you running from
me?" (R. 229). Trooper Wassmer may have also inquired if
defendant was on probation and also asked about cocaine in plain
view in the car, all prior to advising defendant of his Miranda
rights (R. 224).3
Trooper Wassmer conducted formal questioning on these
same topics after defendant was advised of his Miranda rights,
one half hour after his arrest (R. 223, 229-30).

Trooper Wassmer

asked defendant if he understood each of his Miranda rights (R.
216).

Defendant responded "Yes" (R. 216). Trooper Wassmer then

asked defendant:

"Having these rights in mind, do you want to

talk to us now?" (R. 216). Defendant said, "I don't know" (R.
216).

Trooper Wassmer explained that defendant "didn't have to

talk to [them] if he didn't want to. He didn't have to answer
questions.

[x]Its up to you.[']" (R. 217). Defendant indicated

that he understood the trooper's explanation by nodding his head
up and down (R. 217). Noting defendant's affirmative response,
the trooper asked:

2

"So why did you run?" (R. 217). Defendant

See Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436 (1966)•

3

Defendant's responses to Trooper Wassmer's pre-Miranda
questioning were not introduced at the suppression hearing.
5

replied, "The plate's on the wrong car[J" and also stated "that
he [was] out past time" (R. 217)4.
Approximately 15 minutes later, while defendant was
being transported to the county jail, he initiated further
conversation with the trooper (R. 218). Specifically, defendant
asked, "So what are you charging me with?" (R. 218). Trooper
Wassmer told defendant that he would be charged with "[e]vading,
improper registration, no driver's license, no insurance, and
possession of cocaine" (R. 218). Defendant stated:

"Hey, man,

I'll admit to everything else, but the cocaine isn't mine" (R.
218).

Seeking clarification of defendant's admission, Trooper

Wassmer asked defendant: "So you admit you saw my lights and were
trying to run from me?" (R. 219). Defendant said, "Yeah, I was,
but the cocaine isn't mine" (R. 219).
During the entirety of his encounter with defendant,
Trooper Wassmer experienced no difficulty communicating with
defendant in English (R. 229). Trooper Wassmer observed that
defendant spoke English well and appeared to understand the
trooper's questions (R. 229).
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress
"all statements made by him to police" (R. 23), and a motion in
limine to exclude: 1) "all evidence concerning alleged cocaine
found in proximity to [defendant] . . . ; 2) all evidence that
[defendant] was on probation . . . ; 3) all evidence of

4

A reference to defendant's status as a probationer (R.

219) .

6

[defendant's] criminal history; and 4) any other evidence which
the prosecution intends to present which reflects poorly on
[defendant's] character . . ."

(R. 25-26).

An evidentiary hearing was held on September 26, 1995.
In argument to the court, the prosecutor clarified that he did
not intend to introduce any evidence of defendant's cocaine
possession or other bad acts evidence; nor did he intend to
introduce any conversation that occurred between defendant and
Trooper Wassmer prior to the administration of Miranda warnings
(R. 231, 239).

I

Defense counsel argued that the trooper should have
tape recorded his conversation with defendant, that defendant was
entitled to a Miranda warning prior to any questioning; and that
defendant had not waived his Miranda rights, but had equivocally
invoked his right to silence (R. 235-36).

Finally, defense

counsel challenged the voluntariness of defendant's admissions
(R. 237).
In light of the prosecutor's representation that he
would not attempt to introduce defendant's pre-Miranda
statements, the trial court denied defendant's motion to
suppress, finding as follows:
Trooper Wassmer arrested defendant and a few
moments later, in Trooper Wassmer's car,
advised the defendant of his Miranda rights
by reading them from a standard DUI form.
Trooper Wassmer asked the defendant if he
understood his Miranda rights. The defendant
replied[,] "Yes."

7

Trooper Wassmer asked the defendant if he
would answer questions. The defendant
stated[,] "I don't know." Trooper Wassmer
said[,] "You don't have to answer questions
if you don't want to. It's up to you." The
defendant nodded his head in an affirmative
manner.
Trooper Wassmer then asked, "So why did you
run?" The defendant immediately answered,
"The plates are on the wrong car."
Trooper Wassmer did not record this conversation.
(R. 63-64) (a complete copy of the trial court's Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, is attached as addendum A ) .
Based on the above findings, the trial court concluded:
Proper Miranda warnings were administered to
[] defendant by Trooper Wassmer.
[D]efendant understood his Miranda rights.
[D]efendant knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before
questioning ensued.
The questions and answers given post-Miranda
are admissible in the trial.
Trooper Wassmer's in the field unrecorded
questioning of the defendant did not violate
any of [] defendant's constitutional rights.
(R. 65), see addendum A.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
POINT I
It is well established that absent any record of
coercion, the mere fact of a prior Miranda violation does not
render inadmissible admissions obtained following a subsequent
and valid waiver of Miranda rights. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S.
298 (1985).

Because there is no claim or record of coercion

S

regarding either defendant's pre- and/or post-Miranda admissions
in this case, the trial court properly ruled that defendant's
post-Miranda statements were admissible.
Upon being advised of his Miranda rights, defendant was
initially uncertain whether he wanted to speak with police.
However, he nodded his head affirmatively when Trooper Wassmer
further explained that he did not have to talk if he did not want
to.

Additionally, defendant, unhesitatingly gave an

incriminating response to the trooper's follow-up questioning.
Recent controlling authority from the United States Supreme Court
definitively held that police are not required to cease
questioning of a suspect who has equivocally invoked his right to
counsel, nor are they limited solely to asking clarifying
questions.

Davis v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (1994).

Thus,

analogizing to the instant facts, the trooper's questioning of
defendant was proper.

Further, the Utah Supreme Court has held

similar affirmative conduct in response to police questioning to
constitute a valid Miranda waiver.

State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385

(Utah 1986); State v. Calamity, 735 P.2d 39 (Utah 1987).
Accordingly, the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion
to determine that defendant's waiver of Miranda rights was
knowing, intelligent and voluntary.
POINT II
Defendant's complaint that the trial court's limitation
of his cross-examination of Trooper Wassmer violated his
constitutional right of confrontation is not properly before
9

Court-

Defendant failed to specifically preserve his claim of

constitutional error below; nor has he asserted plain error or
other exceptional circumstance excusing his waiver on appeal.
The trial court properly determined under rule 403,
Utah Rules of Evidence, that defendant's attempt to cross-examine
the trooper concerning the omission of the Miranda violation from
his report, without also bringing out defendant's previously
suppressed and incriminating statements, would unnecessarily
confuse and mislead the jury.

Defendant has failed to adequately

challenge the trial court's rule 403 determination in his brief
on appeal.

He only briefly describes the perceived effect of the

court's ruling on his defense and offers no analysis regarding
how or why the evidentiary ruling constitutes an abuse of the
trial court's broad discretion.
938 (Utah 1994).

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d, 932,

Consequently, the issue is waived due to

defendant's non-compliance with the briefing rule. Utah R. App.
P. 24(a)(9); State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249 n.5 (Utah App.
1992).
In any event, the right to confrontation is properly
limited by rule 403. The trial court made a well considered
determination that the limited probative value of impeaching the
trooper with the omission of the Miranda violation from his
report was outweighed by its strong tendency to confuse and
mislead the jurors, particularly if introduced in the isolated
context requested by defendant.

10

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT
DEFENDANT'S WAIVER OF MIRANDA RIGHTS WAS
KNOWING, INTELLIGENT, AND VOLUNTARY
The trial court's conclusion that defendant
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda
rights is well supported in the record.

Defendant does not

dispute the trial court's findings that Trooper Wassmer advised
him of his rights and that he told the trooper he understood
those rights (R. 64), see addendum A.

While defendant initially

told the trooper that he did not know if

he wanted to waive his

rights, defendant does not dispute that he subsequently nodded
his head in understanding when Trooper Wassmer explained that he
"didn't have to talk . . . if he didn't want to," nor does
defendant dispute that he then proceeded to answer the trooper's
questions (R. 64), see addendum A.
Rather, defendant challenges the trial court's waiver
determination on the narrow grounds that the trooper's preMiranda questioning impermissibly tainted his post-Miranda
statements, and that his "mere nodding of the head" was
inadequate to constitute a valid Miranda waiver.

Br. of App. at

11-16, 20, 23, 27. Defendant's contentions lack merit.
A.

Pre-Miranda Confession Does Not Bar Admission of PostMiranda Statements
In Point 1(A) of his brief, defendant claims that his

unwarned confession "let the cat out of the bag[;]fl consequently,

11

his later confession, obtained after a Miranda waiver, is
barred.5 Br. of App. at 12, 16. The Utah Supreme Court
considered and rejected a similar challenge to the admission of a
post-Miranda confession in State v. James, 858 P.2d 1012, 1016
(Utah 1993).

See also State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 465-66

(Utah 1988).

As recognized in James, the United States Supreme

Court "definitively addressed" this issue Oregon v. Elstad, 470
U.S. 298 (1985) .
Elstad clarified that the "Fifth Amendment prohibits
only coerced

confessions."

James, 858 P.2d at 1016 (citing 470

U.S. at 306-07) (emphasis added).

While Miranda warnings are

intended to serve the Fifth Amendment goal, they may also
"sweep[] more broadly" than the amendment.
306.

Elstad, 470 U.S. at

Specifically, "[f]ailure to administer Miranda warnings

creates a presumption
(emphasis added).

of compulsion."

Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307

Thus, Miranda can be "triggered even in the

absence of a Fifth Amendment violation."
306.

Elstad, 470 U.S. at

For example, "unwarned statements that are otherwise

voluntary within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment must
nevertheless be excluded from evidence under Miranda."

Elstad,

470 U.S. at 307.
Significantly, however, Elstad further clarified that
the presumption of coercion attendant to a pre-Miranda confession
does not attach to a later confession, obtained after a Miranda

5

The State's refutation of defendant's claim of an
inadequate waiver is set forth in Part B, infra.

12

waiver.

Indeed, "once warned, the suspect is free to exercise

his own volition in deciding whether or not to make a statement
to the authorities."

Elstad at 308. Accordingly, the Supreme

Court ruled that
absent deliberately coercive or improper
tactics in obtaining the initial statement,
the mere fact that a suspect has made an
unwarned admission does not warrant a
presumption of compulsion. A subsequent
administration of Miranda warnings to a
suspect who has given a voluntary but
unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice
to remove the conditions that precluded
admission of the earlier statement.
470 U.S. at 314. Under the above circumstance, Elstad concludes
that a trial court could reasonably determine that a suspect
"made a rational and intelligent choice whether to waive or
invoke his rights."

Id.

Applying Elstad and James to the instant facts, the
crucial issue is the voluntariness of defendant's second, postMiranda confession, and not whether it can be tied to the

13

presumptively involuntary first confession.6

It is therefore

significant that defendant makes no claim and points to no record
evidence of coercion regarding either the circumstances of his
initial unwarned confession, or his subsequent warned admissions.
Br. of App. at 11-16.

See James, 858 P.2d at 1016 ("Unless the

record indicates otherwise, failure to administer a Miranda
warning before interrogating defendant does not create a
presumption that defendant's second confession was compelled.");
Bishop, 753 P.2d at 466 (affirming admission of Bishop's warned
statements, citing absence of police coercion during both preand post-Miranda questioning).

6

To the extent that defendant's subheading 1(A) and n.4
suggest the Court must engage in an attenuation analysis to
determine if his confession was obtained in the course of police
exploitation of a prior illegality, the argument is waived.
Defendant made no argument concerning the alleged necessity of an
attenuation analysis below and his vague and unanalyzed
references to the argument on appeal are inadequate under the
briefing rule. State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249 (Utah App.
1992). See also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) ("The argument shall
contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect
to the issues presented, including the grounds for review any
issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.").
Defendant has not alleged plain error or any exceptional
circumstance to excuse his waiver of the issue. State v. Brown,
856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah App. 1993).
Moreover, the Miranda violation alleged here does not
amount to a constitutional deprivation, let alone a Fourth
Amendment violation of the type necessitating an attenuation
analysis. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306 ("a procedural Miranda
violation differs in significant respects from violations of the
Fourth Amendment, which have traditionally mandated a broad
application of the 'fruits' doctrine.11). See also State v.
Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 300 (Utah 1992) (engaging in attenuation
analysis to determine effect of alleged illegal
arrest,
a fourth
amendment issue, on Allen's post-Miranda admissions).
14

Because there is no claim or record of coercion before
the Court, and because the mere fact of the prior Miranda
violation does not create a presumption of coercion attendant to
defendant's post-Miranda admissions, the trial court did not
abuse its broad discretion in rejecting defendant's claim of
involuntariness on these facts.
B.

Acknowledgment of Understanding and Affirmative
Response to Police Questioning Constitutes Valid
Miranda Waiver
Turning to defendant's challenge to the trial court's

waiver determination, the Utah Supreme Court recently reiterated
that "police may question an individual who agrees to speak with
them after being read his Miranda rights."
889 P.2d 419, 426, (Utah 1995).

State v. Villarreal,

In Point 1(B) of his brief,

defendant asserts that his "mere nodding of the head was not an
appropriate clarification" of his intention to waive his Miranda
rights and therefore all statements made following the warning
should be suppressed.

Br. of App. at 23.

Significantly,

defendant does not dispute that he understood his Miranda rights,
or that he never unequivocally invoked his rights.
at 17-29.

Br. of App.

Further, as previously noted in Part A, supra,

defendant makes no assertion that he was physically or
psychologically coerced into relinquishing his Miranda rights.
Id.7

Consequently, the issue before the Court is whether, in
7

See State v. Heaelman, 717 P.2d 1348, 1349 (Utah 1986)
("Evidence sufficient to support a finding that a confession is
involuntary must reveal some physical or psychological force or
manipulation that is designed to induce the accused to talk when
he otherwise would not have done so.").
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spite of an equivocal invocation of the right to silence,
defendant's subsequent affirmative head nodding and incriminating
responses to police questioning constituted a valid Miranda
waiver.
As further noted in Part A, supra, the Fifth Amendment
guarantees a criminal defendant that he "shall not be vcompelled
. . . to be a witness against himself.'"

State v. Wood, 868 P.2d

70, 81, (Utah 1993) . To that end, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 444 (1966), established procedural safeguards requiring
police to inform a suspect that he has the right to remain silent
and the right to have an attorney present during questioning.
Wood, 868 P.2d at 81. However, it is the suspect's burden to
affirmatively invoke his right to silence.

State v. Calamity,

735 P.2d 39, 41 (Utah 1987) (quoting Hegelman, 717 P.2d at 1349) .
Accordingly, a Miranda waiver may be inferred from a suspect's
"acknowledgement of [] understanding" and "subsequent course of
conduct," id,, , including "actions and words [.]" State v. Pena,
869 P.2d 932, 941 (Utah 1994) (quoting North Carolina v. Butler,
441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979)).

A Miranda waiver is determined under

the totality of the circumstances and it is the State's burden to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was
voluntary, knowing/ and intelligent.

Wood, 868 P.2d at 81;

Bishop, 753 P.2d at 463; Calamity, 735 P.2d at 41.
Defendant's equivocal, "I don't know," response to
Trooper Wassmer'g initial request for a Miranda waiver does not
constitute an affirmative invocation of the right to silence.
16

Calamity, 735 P.2d at 41; Hecrelman, 717 P.2d at 1349.8

In State

v. Kelly, the Utah Supreme Court considered similar equivocating
conduct and upheld the trial court's waiver determination.
P.2d 385, 392 (Utah 1986).

718

Like defendant, Kelly initially

hesitated when, following the giving of Miranda warnings, police
asked if he wanted to answer questions, stating:
It depends."

"I don't know.

Kellv, 718 P.2d at 392. An officer told Kelly that

he "needed a yes or no answer, but [Kelly] did not respond."

Id.

at 388. The officer then asked what Kelly had been wearing that
night and Kelly pointed to clothing lying at his feet.

Id.

When

the officer picked up the clothing, Kelly spontaneously stated
that he wanted to level with police and made certain admissions.
Id.
In affirming the trial court's Miranda waiver ruling,
the supreme court held that in view of Kelly's initial equivocal
response, it was proper for the police to ask further questions.
Id. at 392. The supreme court also cited Kelly's affirmative
8

Indeed, defendant's authority deals primarily with the
procedures to be followed upon an equivocal
invocation of Miranda
rights. See Br. of App. at 17-29 (citing State v. Sampson, 808
P.2d 1100 (Utah App. 1990) and State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894
(Utah App. 1993)). To the extent Sampson and Gutierrez mandate
that only clarifying questions may be asked once a suspect
equivocally invokes his Miranda rights, they are overruled by
recent controlling authority from the United States Supreme
Court, Davis v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (1994). Davis
definitively held that police are not required to cease
questioning of a suspect who has equivocally invoked his right to
counsel, nor are they limited solely to asking clarifying
questions. 114 S.Ct. at 2355-56. Thus, analogizing to the
instant case, Trooper Wassmer's post-Miranda questioning of
defendant was proper.
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conduct in spontaneously responding to the officer's questions
with particular admissions.

Id.

Accord Davis, 114 S.Ct. at

2355-56.
Calamity is another factually similar case further
emphasizing that affirmative conduct in response to police
questioning constitutes a valid Miranda waiver.

Calamity, 735

P.2d at 41. Unlike defendant and Kelly, Calamity made no
arguably equivocal invocation of Miranda rights.

However, like

defendant, Calamity did not respond verbally when asked if he
understood his Miranda rights, but rather, nodded his head.
Calamity, 735 P.2d at 41.

Calamity then complied with a police

request that he write a voluntary statement, read his Miranda
rights, and fill out a form.

Calamity, 735 P.2d at 40.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, the
supreme court concluded that Calamity's written confession "must
be viewed as having been made under a valid waiver."

Id. at 41.

In particular, the supreme court noted the lack of evidence that
police had in any way coerced the waiver, that Calamity was fully
apprised he did not have to make the written the statement, and
that Calamity benefitted from twice receiving the Miranda
warnings.

Calamity, 735 P.2d at 41.
As in the present case, neither Kelly nor Calamity

verbally informed police of their ultimate willingness to waive
their Miranda rights.

Butler, 441 U.S. at 373 (rejecting

argument that valid Miranda waiver requires an express written or
oral statement).

Rather, despite his earlier hesitancy, Kelly
18

demonstrated his willingness to answer questions by pointing to
incriminating clothing and by spontaneously making certain
admissions.

Kellv, 718 P. 2d at 392. Calamity experienced no

hesitancy and similarly commenced to make a written statement as
requested by police.

Calamity, 735 P.2d at 40.

See also

Heaelman, 717 P.2d at 1349 (upholding waiver ruling where
Hegelman indicated his understanding of Miranda rights,
demonstrated no signs of fear before or after altercation with
officer, and thereafter made incriminating statements to another
officer when informed of the evidence against him).
Defendant's initial hesitancy to answer the trooper's
questions may well have been "a natural reaction to being
questioned, [but] does not indicate that his right to remain
silent was violated."

Villarreal, 889 P.2d at 426 (Utah 1995).

Indeed, notwithstanding his initial hesitancy, defendant
subsequently assured the officer that he understood his rights by
nodding his head up and down (R. 64), see addendum A.

This

affirmative conduct, followed by defendant's unhesitating and
incriminating response to the trooper's follow up questioning,
adequately support the trial court's determination of a valid
Miranda waiver.

Accord People v. Sully 812 P.2d 163, 185 (Cal.

1991) (affirming waiver determination where defendant, a former
police officer, expressly affirmed his understanding of his
Miranda rights and then proceeded to answer questions), cert,
denied, 503 U.S. 944 (1992); United States v. Ocrden. 572 F.2d
501, 502 (5th Cir.) (waiver adequately indicated by defendant's
19

expression of understanding followed by an incriminating
statement), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 979 (1978); People v. Johnson.
450 P.2d 865, 874 (Cal.) ("Once the defendant has been informed
of his rights and indicates that he understands those rights, it
would seem that his choosing to speak and not requesting a lawyer
is sufficient evidence that he knows his rights and chooses not
to exercise them."), cert, denied, 395 U.S. 969 (1969).
Consistent with Butler, Kelly, Calamity, and Hegelman,
the preponderance of the evidence in this case indicates the
trial court reasonably exercised its discretion to conclude that
defendant's Miranda waiver was knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary.

This Court should so hold.
POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN LIMITING DEFENDANT'S CROSS-EXAMINATION OF
TROOPER WASSMER UNDER RULE 403, UTAH RULES OF
EVIDENCE
A,

Waiver of Claimed Constitutional Violation
At trial, defense counsel attempted to cross-examine

Trooper Wassmer about the fact that the Miranda violation was not
mentioned in the trooper's report of the incident (R. 306) (a
copy of the pertinent portion of the transcript is attached as
addendum B).

Upon objection from the prosecutor, defense counsel

stated:
It's my position that it's part of our
constitutional rights to present a defense to
the let [sic] the jurors know that this
officer violated the law, that being Miranda,
and failed to put it in his police report. I
think it's fundamental to our confrontation
20

(R. 308), see addendum B.
Further, although defense counsel wanted to introduce
the Miranda violation, she did not want to bring out the
substance of the pre-Miranda questioning or defendant's
incriminating responses thereto and reminded the trial court that
that evidence had been ruled inadmissible under rules 403 and
404, Utah Rules of Evidence (R. 308-09), see addendum B.

The

prosecutor responded that to introduce the fact of the Miranda
violation without also introducing the questions asked and
defendant's responses would mislead and confuse the jury (R.
310), see addendum B.
The trial court sustained the State's objection under
rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence,9 ruling that the probative
value of the evidence was outweighed by the danger of misleading
and confusing the jury (R. 315-17), see addendum B.
For the first time on appeal, defendant alleges that
the trial court "precluded [him] from attacking Trooper Wassmer's
credibility during cross-examination[,]" and that the limitation
amounted to a violation of his "constitutional right of crossexamination."

Br. of App. at 30, 33. Defendant, however, fails

to indicate where in the record he preserved this precise claim
9

Utah R. Evid. 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
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below.

See Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (5) (a) . Nor has he asserted

plain error or any exceptional circumstance that would justify
this Court's consideration of his constitutional claim.

Utah R.

App. P. 24(a)(9); State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 705 n.2 (Utah
App. 1993); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App.
1992).
Moreover, defendant's "nominal allusion" to a general
right of confrontation below is inadequate to preserve the
constitutional violation he alleges on appeal.

See, e.g., State

v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah 1990) ("the proper forum in
which to commence thoughtful and probing analysis of state
constitutional interpretation is before the trial court").

See

also State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144-45 (Utah 1989)
(finding "general motion" below failed to "specifically or
distinctly" preserve grounds for appeal as required by the waiver
rule).

The reference was neither distinct nor specific and

wholly failed to articulate a federal or state constitutional
right of confrontation that would justify admission of the
contested evidence.

State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 661 (Utah

1985) ("where a defendant fails to assert a particular ground for
suppressing unlawfully obtained evidence in the trial court, an
appellate court will not consider that ground on appeal").
Rather than articulate how defendant's right of confrontation was
violated (particularly where the trooper was on the stand and
available to answer questions), defense counsel's complaint
centered on the court's refusal to allow a line of questioning
22

which the trial court reasonably found objectionable under rule
403 (R. 308-316), see addendum B.10

Consequently, the only

issue properly before the Court is the propriety of the trial
court's limitation of defendant's cross-examination under rule
403.
Even if the Court deems defense counsel adequately
articulated a constitutional argument below, the trial court did
not address the constitutional right of confrontation in its
ruling.

"[W]here defendant fails to invoke a ruling on his

motion, he has waived the issue for purposes of appeal."

State

v. Ortiz, 782 P.2d 959, 961 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 795
P.2d 113 8 (Utah 1990).

Thus, the issue remains inadequately

preserved for review.
B.

Inadequate Challenge to Trial Court's Rule 403
Determination
As for the propriety of the trial court's rule 403

limitation on defendant's cross-examination of Trooper Wassmer,
defendant has not adequately challenged the ruling on appeal.
Defendant only briefly describes the perceived effect of the
ruling on his defense, Br. of App. at 31, and offers no analysis
regarding how or why the evidentiary ruling constitutes an abuse
10

Defendant asserts that following its rule 4 03
determination, the trial court erroneously found that defense
counsel "had explored the full extent of Trooper Wassmer's preMiranda violations and the nature of the omissions from his
police report[.]" Br. of App. at 31 n.9. Defendant misreads the
record which merely reflects defense counsel's request to make a
record of her proffered questions and the trial court's
acknowledgement that: "the record can reflect that you've
[defense counsel] asked the opportunity to question the officer
about certain matters which I've ruled to be improper" (R. 320).
23

of the trial court's "broad" discretion.
P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994) (dicta).

See State v. Pena, 869

See also State v. Hamilton,26

827 P.2d 232# 239-40 (Utah 1992) (reviewing trial court's rule
403 determination for "reasonability").
To the extent the issue is mentioned in defendant's
brief, it is merely incidental to his chief complaint concerning
the alleged harmfulness of the claimed abridgment of his
constitutional right of confrontation.

Br. of App. at 31-35.

Defendant's nominal complaint regarding the trial court's rule
403 determination is inadequate under the briefing rule and
should be rejected by the Court.

Utah R. App. Pro. 24(a) (9)

("The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the
appellant with respect to the issues presented . . . " ) .

See

State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247/ 249 n.5 (Utah App. 1992) (citing
cases disposed of on appeal for failure to provide meaningful
analysis and otherwise comply with the briefing rule).
C#

Trial Court Has Broad Discretion to Limit CrossExamination Under Rule 403
In any event/ the constitutional right of confrontation

is not boundless, but is properly restricted by rule 403. See,
e.g., State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200# 203 (Utah 1987) (crossexamination for bias properly limited under rule 403); State v.
Cox, 826 P.2d 656/ 661 (Utah App. 1992) (same).

In the present

case, the trial court expressly weighed the limited probative
value of impeaching the trooper with the omission of the Miranda
violation from his report/ against its strong tendency to confuse
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and mislead the jurors, particularly if introduced in the
isolated context requested by defendant:
To now attempt to bring in the officer's
omission of the pre-Miranda statements would
no doubt create in the jurors' minds concern
about what was said and mislead and confuse
them. I've ruled that pre-Miranda statements
were not admissible, and now to attempt to
show the officer omitted these statements
from his report, while probative as bearing
upon his credibility, is substantially
outweighed, in my view, by the danger of
misleading or confusing the jury. Therefore,
the questioning about the claimed omission of
the pre-Miranda statements from the officer's
statement is disallowed.
[T]he issue of the omission by the officer of
these statements from his report seems to me
to still be one of considerable import to
this Court and the jurors' consideration of
the issues. The statements that were made
have been excluded. To now attempt to
establish that by leaving them out of the
report, whatever they were, of course, which
won't come to the jurors' attention, would
be, in my judgment, confusing to jury [sic]
and very likely mislead them[,] in the sense
that they would not know what it was that was
omitted here, would not know why it was that
this information is being kept from them[,]
and potentially, therefore, I think it is -the danger of misleading and confusing them
far outweighs the probative value of pointing
to an omission of an officer's report.
(R. 315-17), see addendum B (emphasis added).
Defendant's conclusory assertion that the above ruling
caused the jury to be mislead concerning the trooper's
credibility, Br. of App. at 30-31, fails to pinpoint any abuse of
the court's broad discretion.

Pena, 869 P.2d at 938. To the

contrary, the ruling is adequately detailed and well considered.
See Hackford, 737 P.2d at 204 (noting preference for express
25

findings in the record allowing the reviewing court to understand
the trial court's reasons for barring or limiting crossexamination) .
Furthermore, defendant was afforded adequate
opportunity to challenge the trooper's credibility before the
jury.

Defendant extensively cross-examined the trooper

concerning the facts that the incident was neither videotaped nor
recorded and that the trooper did not obtain a written waiver of
rights from defendant (R. 319-320, 332-333, 337-38).

Defendant

also brought out alleged inconsistencies and discrepancies in the
trooper's testimony including whether the trooper could remember
which side of defendant's car was sagging (R. 321-23).

Defendant

further established that the trooper never issued a citation for
the equipment violation, and that the trooper never reported the
equipment violation to dispatch (R. 324) . Defense counsel
highlighted the above testimony and other alleged inconsistencies
in closing argument, suggesting to the jury that the trooper had
lied and was therefore unreliable (R. 350-54).

Thus, the record

itself refutes defendant's claim that the trial court's
limitation of cross-examination precluded his ability to attack
the trooper's credibility.
Moreover, consistent with the court's ruling, none of
defendant's pre-Miranda admissions were introduced at trial.
Indeed, there was no evidence of defendant's cocaine possession
or his probationary status.

Rather, Trooper Wassmer testified

solely concerning defendant's post-Miranda admissions that the
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license plates were on the wrong car and that defendant had tried
to flee from the trooper (R. 300-01).

Assuming defendant had

prevailed in his attempt to cross-examine Trooper Wassmer
concerning the narrow fact of the Miranda violation, he risked
admission of his previously suppressed incriminating statements.
As noted by the trial court, bringing out the pre-Miranda
admissions would have been necessary to explain the circumstances
surrounding the Miranda violation and thereby avoid undue and
irrelevant speculation by the jury (R. 311-13).

CONCLUSION
The Court should uphold the trial court's rulings
admitting defendant's post-Miranda admissions and limiting
defendant's cross-examination of Trooper Wassmer, and should
affirm defendant's third degree felony conviction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^V

day of June, 1995.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

fe^^/^^A^

HAN DECKER
A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A
Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law on Defendant's Motion to Suppress

DAVID E.YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
ROBERT L. STOTT, Bar No. 3131
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)363-7900

OCT 1 1 1994

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

)
,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPRESS

)

Case No. 941901168FS

'

Hon. J. Dennis Frederick

-vsROGELIO LEYVA LIMONTA,
Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came before the Court on September 26,1994, to hear
argument on the defendant's Motion to Suppress. Defendant was represented by his attorney,
Elizabeth Hunt, and the State was represented by Robert L. Stott. The Court having heard
argument and evidence presented by the parties, hereby makes the following findings
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On July 24,1994, at approximately 9:00 PM, Utah Highway Trooper Jon Wassmer
was on duty and traveling in his marked Highway Patrol vehicle on 1-15 near 4500 South in Salt
Lake County.
2. Trooper Wassmer noticed a vehicle traveling the same direction which appeared to sag
badly on one side.
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 941901168FS
Page two

3. Trooper Wassmer asked Dispatch to run the license plate number to determine its
registration. He learned that the plate was registered to an 1984 Buick.
4. The vehicle was, however, as Trooper Wassman could see, an Oldsmobile.
5. Trooper Wassmer pulled in behind the vehicle and activated his overhead lights.
6. Rather than stopping the vehicle immediately, increased its speed from 55 mph to 75
mph and sped down the freeway.
7. Trooper Wassmer activiated his siren and pursued the vehicle which eventually left
the freeway at 90th South and crashed as it attempted to make a turn.
8. The defendant was, and had been driving the car.
9. Trooper Wassmer arrested the defendant and a few moments later, in Trooper
Wassmer's car, advised the defendant of his Miranda rights by reading them from a standard DUI
form.
10. Trooper Wassmer asked the defendant if he understood his Miranda rights. The
defendant replied "Yes."
11. Trooper Wassmer asked the defendant if he would answer questions. The defendant
stated "I don't know." Trooper Wassmer said "You don't have to answer questions if you don't
want to. It's up to you." The defendant nodded his head in an affirmative manner.
12.

Trooper Wassmer then asked, "So why did you run?" The defendant immediately

answered, "The plates are on the wrong car."
13. Trooper Wassmer did not record this conversation.
WHEREFORE, having entered its Findings of Facts, the Court now makes the following
conclusions
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 941901168FS
Page three

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The stop and arrest of the defendant by Trooper Wassmer was based upon his
observing traffic violations occurring in his presense: license plate violation, speeding, and
failure to respond to an officer's signal.
2. The defendant's arrest and stop did not violate either Utah or United States
constitutional provisions.
3. Proper Miranda warnings were administered to the defendant by Trooper Wassmer.
4. The defendant understood his Miranda rights.
5. The defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights
before questioning fasued.
6. The questions and answers given post-Miranda are admissible in the trial.
7.

Trooper Wassmer's in the field unrecorded questioning of the defendant did not

violate any of the defendant's constitutional rights.
DATED this

Jfl^day of October, 1994.
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Third J'jQ.CiSi DioUiCt

DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
ROBERT L. STOTT, Bar No. 3131
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)363-7900

OCT 1 1 1994
By.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

-vsCase No. 941901168FS
ROGELIO LEYVA LIMONTA,
Hon. J. Dennis Frederick
Defendant.

Based upon the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now, therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied.
DATED this

[[trday of October, 1994.
BY THE COURT:

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing to Elizabeth
Hunt, at the office of the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300,
Salt Lake City Ut 84111, this

day of October, 1994.
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ADDENDUM B
Transcript of Suppression Hearing

Q

How many days?

A

Just a few.

Q

And is it your position that the report is

complete?
A

I believe so, yes.

Q

It's your testimony today that you approached

Mr, Leyva after his car had stopped, and when you approached
him, you gave him Miranda warnings and then proceeded to
interrogate him and then proceeded to obtain a confession,
correct?
A

That's correct.

Q

And that's what your report says, too, right?

A

It does.

Q

In fact, didn't you ask Mr. Leyva some incriminat-

ing questions before you ever gave him the Miranda warnings?
A

I did ask him one question before.
MR. STOTT:

Your Honor, may we approach the bench?

THE COURT:

All right.

Come up here, folks.

(Whereupon, both counsel and the Court conferred
at the bench out of the hearing of the jury and the
Reporter.)
THE COURT:

Members of the jury, we have come upon

an issue of law that I must resolve with the lawyers in this
case.

It's near enough, however, to your noon recess that

I'm going to release you and remind you again of the
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admonition I've given you.
You are free until 1:30 this afternoon, at which
time we'll reconvene and hear the balance of the evidence in
the case.

The jury is now excused.
(Whereupon, the jury exited the courtroom.)
THE COURT:

room.

Okay.

The jury has now left the court-

There appears to be a difference of view about what

was or was not stipulated to, and I want you to state,
Mr. Stott, for the record your objection or request from the
bench conference and I'll hear from Ms. Hunt.
MR. STOTT: Well, I gathered from our discussion at
the bench that her intent is to try to establish that somehow
the officer violated Miranda warnings.

So my position is

that we've had a hearing on that and the Court ruled that
there was no Miranda warning violation, and also the State
did not inquire into any questioning that went on before the
Miranda warnings were given, so I think it's improper for her
to now somehow try to imply that the officer failed to give
the correct Miranda warning when, one, we aren't using that
as part of our evidence and, two, the Court made a ruling
that Miranda warnings were complied with.
THE COURT: All right.

Ms. Hunt, do you wish to

respond?
MS. HUNT:

I do, your Honor.

I have the prelim-

inary hearing transcript and also the motion hearing
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transcript which clearly establishes a Miranda violation.
Mr. Stott himself stated at the hearing on the motion to
suppress that there was, quote, some indication that there
was a conversation before Miranda.

I have no intentions of

bringing out any of that conversation.
Now, the fact that Mr. Stott is not bringing in
that conversation is immaterial because the officer supposedly got the confession before and after Miranda, the content
being the same.
It's my position that it's part of our constitutional rights to present a defense to the let the jurors know
that this officer violated the law, that being Miranda, and
failed to put it in his police report.

I think it's funda-

mental to our confrontation.
THE COURT:
sion hearing.

It's been some time since the suppres-

What was the question asking and what was the

response given to the question that you're referring to that
was presumably prior to Miranda?
MS. HUNT:

Well, that's not clear because the offi-

cer is not being consistent as to what the conversations
were.

However, I can find the exact pages of each transcript

for you if you'd give me just a minute.
Bob, I gave you a copy of the motion hearing transcript.

Do you have that?
MR. STOTT:

The motion or the prelim?
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MS. HUNT:

The motion hearing transcript.

I believe page 20 of the motion hearing transcript
establishes —
THE COURT: Well, I'm not so much interested where
in the transcript it was dealt with, I suppose, as I am
interested to know what it is you're eliciting from the
officer.
Now, if it's your point that the officer asked a
question and the Defendant made a response that was prior to
the giving of the Miranda warning, that was not, as I recall,
I didn't recall that having been gone into as being part of
your motion to suppress.
MS. HUNT:
clear, your Honor.

It was.

I guess I didn't make myself

The question reflected in the motion

hearing transcript was that he asked him why he ran before he
gave him a Miranda warning.
probation.

He asked him whether he was on

Obviously I'm not going to bring that out in

front of the jury because this Court has excluded that on
grounds of 404, 403.

He showed him the cocaine before the

Miranda warning and he says he doesn't recall whether he
asked him about the cocaine.
THE COURT:

But that has not been part of the

State's examination in chief.

You're telling me, as I under-

stand you, that you're not seeking the content of the question asked or the answer given, but simply that there was a

58

00309

question asked and there was an answer given, and that that
was prior to giving the Miranda warning, but that that does
not appear in the report?
MS. HUNT: Yes.
THE COURT: All right.

Is there any objection to

MR. STOTT: Well, yes.

I think for the jury to be

that?

able to understand what she's getting at, they ought to know
what the question and answer is.

Just to say there was a

question given and not know what the question was, or an
answer was given and not know what the answer was, it's going
to mislead the jury.
I think they should see the total picture because
now we're getting into stuff that we agreed we wouldn't get
into.
THE COURT:

Well, you keep referring to an agree-

ment, but apparently it's a one-sided agreement, Mr. Stott.
I don't see Ms. Hunt agreeing to anything.
MR. STOTT:

No, what I'm talking about is the

cocaine and the probation because that's what the conversation was about.
THE COURT:

Prior to the Miranda?

MR. STOTT:

Yes. Also her Miranda motion went to

this particular conversation.

It seems to me that if there's

a Miranda violation, then the evidence is not introduced, but
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the fact of a Miranda violation is not relevant.
THE COURT:

Well, I can't apparently establish that

there was or was not an agreement that the inquiry that took
place prior to the Miranda was going to be excluded.
MR. STOTT:

I stated on the record

—

THE COURT:

Well, yeah, I guess I know your posi-

tion that it's not going to be introduced, but it may be an
offer that was not accepted by Ms. Hunt, and if that is the
case, then I suppose if the issue —

if there's no agreement,

in other words, I have ruled on what I understood to be the
issues before me at the suppression hearing and if now you're
inquiring into statements made and responses given by the
Defendant that you contend were inappropriate, then I suppose
that there is a significant chance that I will allow on
redirect examination what was said and by whom.

Do you

follow me?
MS. HUNT:
THE COURT:

I do.
I think it is probably not the appro-

priate thing to do on the one hand to argue that the officer
has violated Miranda by obtaining information from this
Defendant to show that he is something less than stellar in
his investigation, yet, on the same hand, argue that all of
that discussion cannot be brought in.

It may well be appro-

priate and fair, it seems to me, if that's the essence of
your argument, then on redirect examination the officer be
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allowed to state what it was that was said.
MS. HUNT:

May I respond, your Honor?

THE COURT:

You may.

MS. HUNT:

Thank you.

This Court excluded all

reference to cocaine and to the fact that Mr. Leyva was on
probation.

The Court's exclusion —

THE COURT: Well, but the reference to the excluding of the cocaine was in response to the State's agreement
not to introduce it.
MS. HUNT:
THE COURT:
MS. HUNT:
THE COURT:

That's right.
It had nothing to do with your motion.
Oh, that wasn't clear to me.
That was an acknowledgement by the

State that they were not going to even get into the issue of
cocaine possession.

Consequently, as I recall, and I may be

wrong about this, but I recall we were dealing specifically
with statements made by the Defendant having to do with wrong
plates on the car and out past time.
MS. HUNT:

I think the cocaine issue is probably a

moot point as far as what we're talking about now because the
officer's testimony was that he didn't recall whether he
asked about the cocaine or not, so I don't think the
Prosecutor would need to bring that to the jury's attention
because the officer doesn't recall it.
THE COURT:

Well, but there was a comment made
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about cocaine or at least cocaine was observed.
MS. HUNT:

No, that was only my question.

It was

observed, yes, but that's not part of the Miranda violation.
THE COURT:

I'm not quite clear on what it is we're

doing other than trying through a back door to try to get out
another hearing on a motion to suppress, and that may be
wrong.

I'm not saying it's right or wrong, Ms. Hunt, but it

appears to me that if indeed statements made prior to Miranda
warning were part of your motion to suppress and the ruling
on those had to do with what was a presumed stipulation that
the evidence would not be relied upon by the State, that was
the basis of my ruling, not because of the evidence in the
hearing but what I'm going to do is I'm going to allow us all
to take this under consideration for a moment.

I'm not say-

ing that if you elicit from the officer the fact that he
omitted to include in his report this pre-Miranda statement
or statements, therefore, he's something less than a competent officer, I'm not going to rule yet on whether or not by
opening that door he's going to be able to say what it was
that he told the Defendant because apparently there was —

or

the Defendant told him because apparently there was no agreement between you two that that wouldn't be brought into
trial, so if you open the door, I may well determine to allow
the officer to testify as to what was in fact said, and I'll
let you know that at 1:30.
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We'll be in recess until 1:30.
(Whereupon, a recess was taken.)
THE COURT:

We are reconvened in the instant matter

outside the hearing of the jury.

The Defendant and both

counsel are present.
Counsel, I have taken under advisement the objection, or at least the indication that there would be an
objection to further inquiry of the trooper with regard to
the omission in his report of the pre-Miranda statements
engaged in between the officer and the Defendant.
Having reviewed my notes of the suppression hearing, as well as the transcript and Exhibit 1, the officer's
report received during the course of that suppression hearing, I'm prepared to rule at this time.
This Court ruled that the questioning before the
Miranda warning was excluded originally and this because the
State agreed not to introduce such statements and because
eliciting inculpatory statements prior to giving Miranda are
properly excludable.

However, here the Defendant seeks to

introduce only that the trooper omitted reference to such
statements in his report, ostensibly for the purpose of bearing on the credibility of the officer's testimony, without
getting into what was actually said.
The motion to suppress refers, in this Court's
view, only to post-Miranda waiver and/or statements.

The
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issue of omission of statements pre-Miranda was not
addressed, in this Court's view, because the State conceded
not to attempt introduction at the trial, but in any event,
Rule 403 of the Rules of Evidence allows this Court discretion to exclude relevant evidence if it is probative, even
though it may be probative, if the value of such evidence is
substantially outweighed by, among other things, confusing
the issues or misleading the jury.
Here the State has not sought, rightly so, to
introduce the pre-Miranda statements.

There was an agreement

by Defense counsel at the suppression hearing, found on page
27, line 21 of the transcript of that hearing, wherein she
concedes, "I have no intentions of bringing out any of that
conversation before Miranda.

I would agree that the

Defendant was in custody at the time of the questioning which
followed Miranda was given, so there's no question about
custody in this particular case.

I believe he was in

custody."
To now attempt to bring in the officer's omission
of the pre-Miranda statements would no doubt create in the
jurors' minds concern about what was said and mislead and
confuse them.

I've ruled that pre-Miranda statements were

not admissible, and now to attempt to show the officer
omitted these statements from his report, while probative as
bearing upon his credibility, is substantially outweighed, in
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my view, by the danger of misleading or confusing the jury.
Therefore, the questioning about the claimed omission of the
pre-Miranda statements from the officer's statement is disallowed, so now let's bring the jury back in.
Ms. Hunt, you're waving your hand.
MS. HUNT:

I am.

May I have the benefit of the

record just for a moment, your Honor?
THE COURT:
MS. HUNT:

Yes, you may.
Thank you very much.

First of all, I'd

like to call to the Court's attention that the portion of the
motion hearing transcript that the Court just quoted was
Mr. Stott speaking, not me.
THE COURT:

Well, that's an important observation.

MS. HUNT:

What I want to ask the officer is simply

if he asked Mr. Limonta incriminating questions —

Mr. Leyva,

excuse me, incriminating questions before the Miranda warnings and if he omitted that from his report.
The reason I want to do that is because it establishes both that that officer himself is breaking the law and
that he's also excluding that from his report which is supposed to be documenting this case.
gral to our defense.

I feel that this is inte-

We don't have much to work with in this

case other than to confront and cross-examine the officer.
The Miranda ruling itself excludes only the
Defendant's statements.

If there's a Miranda violation, it
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does not exclude the fact that there was a Miranda violation,
nor the officer's question.
That's about all I have to say as far as the
Court's ruling goes.
THE COURT: Well, and that's fine.
address the issue of the misquote.

Let me first

I apologize for having

viewed Mr. Stott's language as that of your own.

Neverthe-

less, my view is even had there not been an agreement, which
apparently there was not, the issue of the omission by the
officer of these statements from his report seems to me to
still be one of considerable import to this Court and the
jurors' consideration of the issues.
were made have been excluded.

The statements that

To now attempt to establish

that by leaving them out of the report, whatever they were,
of course, which won't come to the jurors' attention, would
be, in my judgment, confusing to jury and very likely mislead
them in the sense that they would not know what it was that
was omitted here, would not know why it was that this information is being kept from them and potentially, therefore, I
think it is —

the danger of misleading and confusing them

far outweighs the probative value of pointing to an omission
of an officer's report.

Therefore, the ruling is the same,

so we'll bring the jury back in, let you continue with your
examination of the trooper within the confines of the ruling
that I've now made.
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